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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We propose a Timestamped signature scheme which can be verified universally using 
signer’s public parameters.  A trusted third party, the Timestamping System provides 
timestamp to a signature without even knowing the content of the document. The proposed 
scheme can withstand active attacks, such as forgery attack and chosen cipher text attack. It 
also provides the message recovery feature, i.e., from the timestamped signature, the message 
can be recovered by the receiver. Hence, the message need not be sent with the signature.  
The suggested scheme do not require any hash function and there by reduces the verification 
cost as compared to existing schemes at the expense of marginal increase in signature 
generation cost.  Further, the scheme is more secured as its security lies in solving three 
computationally hard assumptions Performance analysis of both the schemes has been carried 
out in details. We applied the Time-stamped signature scheme with Message recovery in E-
cash system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
For any commercial electronic applications authenticity of any document plays a crucial role. 
A Digital signature should provide the authenticity, data integrity and non-repudation. In the 
Zuhua Shao’s scheme the validity of the signed document can be verified by any recipient. I 
this scheme the signer authenticates the digest with the private key of his own and the 
recipient can verify the authenticity with the public key of the corresponding private key. 
Without the knowledge of the private key of the signer, the signatures cannot be forged. And 
without he time stamp, the document cannot be trusted if the key is lost or compromised. So a 
time stamp service should be established to provide timestamps for every document that a 
signer signs [2,3]. 
A timestamp ensures non-repudiation. Timestamps are provided by trusted third parties, 
known as Time Stamping Systems (TSS).  It provides integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation of document. An authentic timestamp on a signed message ensures that even if 
the secret key of the signer is leaked or compromised, the authenticity and non-repudiation 
features remain intact. Time stamping is compulsory in many applications such as e-cash 
systems and electronic commerce. In all these applications, non-repudiation of a signed 
document is very much important.  For instance, in e-cash systems, electronic coins should be 
associated with a date and time where they were signed by concerned parties. Hence, time 
stamping\ is widely recognized as a methodology to certify that a message was modified or 
signed at a certain point of time. In long term preservation of digital signatures timestamps 
are widely used. Many digital timestamping systems exist, which are based on digital 
signatures and collision free hash functions [2,3]. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1 Cryptography 
 
Cryptography means information hiding from unauthenticated persons/programs. It is 
the application of modern techniques by which modern text (Plain text) is modified in to 
unintelligible text (cipher text). This technique is otherwise called Encryption. In past 
cryptography was being done by a common key (Symmetric Key Cryptography) but due to 
technological advancement now a days we use different key for the encryption process 
(Asymmetric Key Cryptography). These are described in the next section [2,3]. 
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography  
 
2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography  
 
 
2.1.1 Symmetric key cryptography  
 
In symmetric key cryptography the sender sends the message by encrypting the 
message by a key say k1. The receiver after receiving the cipher text decrypts the message by 
using the same key k1. It’s assumed here that both the parties use a common key and the 
transmission of cipher text is done in an insecure channel. This system is flawed if the key k1 
is leaked i.e. if it’s known by the adversary [2,3]. 
 
2.1.2 Asymmetric key cryptography 
 
It’s otherwise known as public key cryptosystem or public key Encipherment, we have the 
same situation as of symmetric key cryptosystem, with a few exception. There are two keys 
one is public key and the other one is private key. To send a secured message, the sender 
encrypts with receiver’s public key. To decrypt the message the receiver uses his own private 
key [2,3]. 
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 RSA Public Key Cryptosystem 
 Elgamal Public Key Cryptosystem 
 
2.1 Digital Signature  
 
A conventional signature is actually a part of the document which is included in the 
document. But in case of Digital signature it is sent along with the document. The sender 
sends the Message along with the signature where both are separate documents. Then the 
recipient receives both the message and signature. And he authenticates the document. 
 
Several digital signature schemes have evolved during the last few decades. In this 
section, we discuss some of the widely used signature schemes [2,3]. 
2.2.1 RSA Digital Signature Scheme  
 
In this scheme the signer, first uses an agreed-upon one way hash function to create 
 
the digest from the message, D = h( M ) . Then he/she signs the digest, S = D 
d
 mod n. The 
message M and signature S are sent to the receiver. The verifier receives the message and 
signature. He/she first, uses the sender’s public exponent to obtain the digest, D' = S 
e
 mod n. 
He/she then applies the Hash algorithm to the message received from the sender to obtain 
 
D = h (M) and compares D & D'. If they congruent then message is accepted else rejected 
[2,3]. 
 
 
Fig.2.1 RSA Digital signature scheme 
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2.2.2 Elgamal Digital Signature Scheme 
 
The sender chooses a secret random number r. The sender generates a new random 
number each time he/she tries to sign a message. Then he/she calculates the signature 
 
S1 = e1
r
 mod p and S 2 = (M - d * S1) *r 
-1
 mod (p-1), where S1 and S2 are the two signatures. 
 
The sender sends M, S1, and S2 to the receiver. To verify the message, the verifier 
calculates [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2.2 ElGamal digital signature scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
V1 = e1
M
 mod p and V2 = e2 
S1 * S1
S2 mod p. IfV1 V2, the message is accepted else rejected. 
 
 
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Function 
 
A cryptographic hash function creates a fixed-size digest out of a variable-sized 
message. Creating such a function is best accomplished using iteration. Instead of using a 
hash function for variable sized inputs, a fixed-sized input is created and is used necessary 
number of times. This fixed-size input function is compression function. 
 
A set of cryptographic hash functions uses compression function from the scratch. 
Some of them are described in the following sections [2]: 
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2.3.1 Message Digest (MD) 
Several hash algorithms are designed by Ron Rivest. These are referred as MD2, MD4 and 
MD5. The MD5 is the strengthened version of MD4 that divides the message into blocks of 
512 bits and creates a 128-bit digest. As 128-bit is too small to resist collision attacks we go 
for what is called SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) [2]. 
 
 
2.3.2 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
 
The Secure Hash Algorithm is a standard that was developed by NIST and was 
published as a FIP standard. It’s mostly based on MD5. The standard was revised in 1995, 
which includes SHA-1. It’s then revised to four new versions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 
and SHA-512. Characteristics of various SHA are shown in Table 1.1 [2]. 
 
Characteristics SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 
      
Maximum Message size 2
64
 – 1 2
64
 – 1 2
64
 - 1 2
128
 – 1 2
128
 - 1 
Block Size 512 512 512 1024 1024 
Message Digest Size 160 224 256 384 512 
Number Of Rounds 80 64 64 80 80 
Word Size 32 32 32 64 64 
Table 1.1 Characteristics of secure hash algorithms 
 
 
2.4 Public Key Distribution 
 
In Asymmetric key cryptography, we assume that the public key of any user in the 
Internet is available to everyone so that they can send messages to each other. But the real 
problem lies on how to distribute the public keys. In order to distribute public keys we go for 
TSS with message Recovery. 
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2.5. Timestamped signatures with Message Recovery 
 
 
In the proposed scheme only the signature is sent through the channel. And the message 
can be recovered from the signature itself by using signer’s public parameters. The 
Original message is recovered from the signature itself. The DSS with message recovery 
consists of two parties; one is the signer and the other is a trusted third party known as 
Time stamping System (TSS). The signer has to generate signature for a message m with 
an authenticated timestamp issued from the TSS. This scheme consists of following three 
phases, namely, setup phase, signature verification and signature generation [7,8]. 
Examples: RSA, Rabin, Nyberg-Rueppel  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ZUHUA SHAO’S MESSAGE HIDDEN TIMESTAMPED 
SIGNATURE 
3.1 Review 
Basically there are three parties in the Existing scheme: 
(1) With the authenticated timestamps the signer calculates the signature and signs the 
document; 
(2) The TSS will add timestamp to the signature; and 
(3) The verifier will check the validity of timestamped signatures. 
 
3.1.1 System parameters: 
  
For a timestamped signature scheme, the TSS chooses a large prime p and a generator g ∈ 
Z 
*
p with order q, where q is a prime divisor of p – 1, and a hash function h ( ). Here p, g 
and h ( ). Here p, g and h () are public system parameters which are authentically known 
to all users. The TSS chooses his private key   xN ∈ Z 
*
q and computes his public key yN = 
g
x
N (mod p). Similarly, the signer chooses a random number xS ∈ Z*q as his own private key 
and computes yS = g
x
S (mod p) as his public key [1].  
  
3.1.2 Signature Generation & Signature verification:  
 
First, the signer computes signature for the message M. The signer chooses a random 
number k1 ∈ Zq
*
, and computes r1 = g
k1
 (mod p), e1 = h (M, r1) and s1 = e1xS + k1 (mod q). 
Then signer will send the tuple   as the signature for the message M to a recipient. 
16 
 
From the relation The recipient computes r1=g
s
1yS
-e1 
(mod p)      and checks e1=h (M, r1). 
The recipient sends (s1,e1) to a TSS inorder to generate the Timestamped signature for the 
message M. 
The TSS selects a random number k2 ∈ Zq*, and computes r2=g
k
2 (mod p), e2=h (t, e1, r2)     
where t is the timestamp. Then TSS sends (t, s, r1, e2) to the recipient. 
Finally the recipient receives the timestamped signature  (s, r1, e2) of the message    and 
timestamp t, which can be verified by checking the following verification equation. 
e=h(t, h(M,r1), g
S 
( (yS yN )
h(M,r
1
)
 r ) 
e
2 ( mod p )). 
Similarly the timestamped signature (s, r1, e2) of the message M and the time information t 
is always to be accepted.  
From the relation e1 and e2 it is clear that for signing the timestamp t is needed for non-
repudiation. From this receiver can verify the signature whether it is not valid and can 
easil predict the time of signing [1]. 
3.2 Proposed Timestamped Digital Signature Scheme with Message 
Recovery:  
The proposed scheme consists of two parties; one is the signer and the other is a trusted 
third party known as Time Stamping System (TSS). The signer has to generate signature 
for a message m with an authentic timestamp issued from the TSS. This scheme consists 
of following three phases: 
 Setup phase 
 Signature Generation 
 Signature Verification 
3.2.1 Setup: 
 
The signer selects an integer n which is equals to the multiplication of big prime numbers 
p and q where p=2p´f+1 and q=2q´f+1. Here, f, p´ and q´ are all prime numbers. Then it 
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chooses a generator g of order f both modulo p and q. After that, it selects e which is co-
prime with both  and q-1 and d is computed using ed≡1 mod Φ(n), where Φ(n) is 
Euler’s Totient function. 
Signer chooses its secret key x in random from Zn* and computes public key as Y = g
x
 
mod n. Finally, the signer publishes the system’s public parameters(Y, g, n, e) and keeps 
d, p, q, f, x as secret. 
3.2.2 Signature Generation: 
Step 1: First, the signer requests the TSS for a timestamp. The TSS acknowledges the 
request by sending t in a secure channel to the signer. Here t is the current date and time. 
Step 2: After receiving the timestamp t, the signer randomly chooses *
n
u Z and 
computes S and 
1
r as  follows. 
 mod dS Y n     (10) 
1
 mod ( )ur S mg n     (11) 
The signer then sends (S, r1, t) to TSS. 
Step 3: After receiving (S, r1, t), the TSS first checks the validity of t. Then it proceeds to 
Step 4 if the condition satisfies.  Otherwise it rejects the signature (S, r1, t) and asks the 
signer to resend the data. 
 mod eS Y n      (12) 
Step 4: The TTS chooses an integer *
n
k Z  and computes the values of r2 and r as 
follows. 
2 1
 mod ( )r k r t n      (13) 
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1
 mod ( ) kr r S g n      (14) 
Then it sends (r, r1, r2, t) to the signer. 
Step 5: After receiving (r, r1, r2, t), the signer checks it with his own (r1, t) as derived in 
Step 1. If they  match, then he accepts the received data and computes ℓ from the 
following linear equation. 
1
2 1
 mod ( )S x r u r n     (15) 
Timestamped signature of the message m is (t, S, r, ℓ). 
3.2.3 Signature Verification: 
 
Any verifier or receiver can verify the signature (t, S, r, ℓ) of message m by checking the 
following condition given as, 
 mod eS Y n     (16) 
The message   can be recovered as,  
 mod nS tm rY g     (17) 
The message is indeed the original one as,  
1
2 1
1
2 1
2 1
2 1
1
1
 mod n  mod n
                      =  mod n
                      =  mod n
                      =  mod n
   
( ( ))
( ( ))
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
x r u rS t k t
x r u rk x t
r u ru k t
u k r u r t
rY g r S g Y g
r S g g g
mg g g g
mg


  
 
 
    
 

1 1                   =  mod n
                      =  mod 
( )k r t k t r
mg
m n
    
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                                   CHAPTER 4 
 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
4.1 PERFORMANCE STUDY  
The complexity of any digital signature scheme depends on four operations, namely, 
multiplication, exponentiation, hash functions and inverse operation. The performance of 
the proposed scheme can be studied by comparing it with some existing schemes [1, 2]. 
The results of performance are tabulated in Table 1. The time for computing the modular 
addition and subtraction computations are neglected. The performance is analyzed with 
the following notations. 
 TE is modular exponentiation time 
 TM is modular multiplication time 
 TI is modular inverse operation time. 
 TH is hash functions performance time. 
It may be observed that the executional cost of signature verification phase of the 
proposed scheme is pretty lower than Shao’s scheme as well as Sun et. al’s scheme. The 
proposed scheme is does not have any hash function unlike Shao’s scheme. The cost of 
signature generation of the proposed scheme is higher than that of both the schemes due 
to more number of inverse operations. However, the proposed scheme is more secured as 
compared to other two schemes.   
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4.2 Comparison with Existing Scheme 
Table I: Execution comparison 
Phases Shao’s Scheme [1] Sun’s 
scheme 
[2] 
Proposed 
Scheme  
Signature 
generation 
4TE +4TM+1TI+3TH 2TE +6TM 4TE 
+4TM+3TI 
Signature 
verification 
3TE +3TM+3TH 4TE +3TM 2TE +2TM  
 
 
- Time required for Exponential Operation   
- Time required for Multiplication operation   
- Time required for Hash operation 
- Time required for Inverse operation  
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output of the TSS 
 
3621  
 
2015-03-09 
 
 06:05:33  
 
14432245684896487005991660720 
87174119458164634120  
 
5971 
 
verified signature 
 
1443224568489648700599166072087174119458164634120 
 
 
Fig.4.1 Output of the Proposed Scheme 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
Security Analysis 
 
We have done the security analysis for both our TSS with message recovery and the offline 
e-cash system which are described as follows. 
 
 
5. 1 Security Analysis of Proposed TSS Scheme with Message Recovery  
 
In this section we will analyze the attacks based on TSS scheme and specify how our scheme 
is secured against them. Our scheme is entirely depend on the discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) and Integer factorization problem (IFP). 
DEFINITION 1: (DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM). The discrete logarithm problem is 
defined as: given a generator g of a group G, and an element h of G, we have to find the DL 
to the base g of h in the group G. DLP is not generally hard. The hardness of DL relies on the 
groups. 
DEFINITION 2: (TYPE I ATTACK). It is difficult to obtain the secret key x from the public 
key Y. An attacker who has access to public key Y has to solve the equations mod xY g n , 
which is clearly a DLP. Also if he needs to factor n, then he has to solve the IFP, as n =pq. 
To obtain the values of p and q, he needs to factor p’ and q’, which is computationally 
infeasible. 
 
DEFINITION 3: (TYPE II ATTACK). Proposed scheme can withstand parameter reduction 
attack. Equation (17) can be rewritten as follows. 
                 m = r. Y
t´
 g
t
   mod n,      
Where t´=S + ℓ and the parameters in the above expression cannot be reduced further. Hence 
the proposed scheme can combat parameter reduction attack. 
22 
 
DEFINITION 4 An intruder cannot fake a valid timestamp. If an intruder attempts to forge a 
valid signature, he needs secret keys of both signer and TSS, whose security lies in the 
difficulty of solving DLP and IFP.  Furthermore, if TSS is dishonest, then also he cannot fake 
an authenticated timestamp without collaboration of signer. Also the TSS can not acquire any 
information of message from the timestamp. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
E-cash System 
 
6.1 Introduction 
An e-cash system can be classified as offline or online. In offline e-cash system customer 
pays merchant without help of bank means there is no role of bank during transaction but 
during deposit merchant will deposit the e-coin in the bank. When customer pays merchant, 
bank should be online means presence of bank is needed during payment. In online e-cash 
system all participants should be online. An e-cash systems replace the traditional system. 
Payments less than “one” is possible through e-cash systems. E-cash systems are used in 
online banking systems; they are also used for online shopping and other purposes. There are 
many features those can be achieved by e-cash System such as [9]. 
 Transferability: Electronic coins will be distributed among people whether the transactions 
are online or offline. 
 Portability: The security of e-coin does not depend upon any physical location. Using 
computer networks we can transfer into storage devices and vice versa. 
 Off-line Payment: Offline payment means there is no need of bank presence during 
transaction between the customer and the merchant 
 Unforgeability: Unforgeability means only Bank can make coins which is an authorized 
party. 
 Anonymity: The spender of the e-coin must stay unknown. On the off chance that the coin is 
spend truly, neither the beneficiary nor the bank can distinguish the spender. 
 Unreusability: The e-coin ought not be replicated and reused. At that point we need to  
Minimize the dangers for forgery and should create a good authentication system.  
Divisibility: E-coin can be divided  into littler sums [9]. 
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6.2 Application of proposed scheme in offline e-cash  
Introduction 
Customer: Customer buys goods or stuffs and gives e-coin to merchant rather 
giving cash or cheque. 
 Merchant: Merchant takes e-coin from the customer and deposits into the bank 
where the purchase amount will be deducted from customer’s account and credited 
to merchant’s account. 
 Bank: Bank tracks all the transaction between merchant and customer, all the 
details of customer and merchant. 
Timestamping System: TSS is a third party, it publishes the public keys and 
private keys for digital signature and cryptography. 
6.2.1 System Setup 
In this protocol, bank and TSS create the public keys and private keys. They will announce 
their public keys publicly. These are the following steps:  
Step 1: Bank randomly chooses 3 prime numbers p0, q0 and f such that p = (2∗p0∗f +1) 
and q = (2 ∗ q0 ∗ f + 1) are primes. 
Step 2: Chooses e which is co-prime with both p − 1 and q − 1. 
Step 3: Computes n = p ∗ q, φ(n)=(p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) and d=e−1 mod φ(n). 
Step 4: Chooses g as a generator of n of order f. 
Step 5: Clearing house chooses x in Zφ(n)∗ and computes Y =gx mod n. 
Step 6: Publishes Public key(Y, g, n, e) , Private key (d, p, q, f, x). 
Step 7: Finally Digital signature is calculated using the signer’s private key and it is verified 
by the receiver using signer’s public key. 
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6.2.2 Withdrawal Protocol: 
Step1: 
Customer requests the TSS for time t, The TSS acknowledges the request by sending ’t’ in a 
secure channel 
Step2: After receiving the timestamp t, the customer randomly chooses *
n
u Z  
 And computes s and as follows 
S = Y
d
 mod n 
m = H(M) 
M = Amount needed 
Then the customer sends (S,m) to bank. 
Step3: Bank receives the (S,m) and verifies the Signature with 
S
e 
= Y mod n 
Bank produces a coin containing coid ID, coin Amount, expiry ( coin information) and sends 
it to bank. 
Step4: Customer receives the message m = H ( CI ) with the Bank timestamp signature. 
S = Y
d 
mod n 
Customer gets (S,m) and checks the validity with the equation 
S
e
 = Y mod n 
6.2.3 Payment Protocol: 
Step1:  
Customer first requests the TSS for time. 
Step2: 
After receiving the timestamp t, the Customer randomly chooses *
n
u Z  
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And computes S and r1 as follows 
S = Y
d 
mod n. 
r1 = ( S + mg
u
 ) mod n 
Customer then sends ( S, r1, t ) to TSS. 
Step3: 
After receiving ( S, r1, t ) the TSS first checks the validity of t. Then it proceeds to step 4 if 
the condition satisfies 
S
e
 = Y mod n 
Step4: The TSS chooses an integer k from Z
*
n and computes the values of r2 and r as follows. 
r2 = (k-r1-t) mod n. 
r = (r1-s) g
-k
 mod n. 
Step5: After receiving (r,r1, r2, t) the signer checks it with his own (r1,t) as derived to step 1. 
If they match then it accepts the received data and computes l from the equation 
S + l = (r2-u+r1) mod n 
The time stamped signature of coin n is ( t, S, r, l ) 
Step 6:  
The (t,S,r,l) is received by the Merchant and verifies with 
S
e
 = Y mod n. 
And coin info with 
m = rg
Y+l
g
t 
mod n 
6.2.4 Deposit Protocol: 
Merchant along with the signature of it sends (t, Sc, SM, r, l ) to Bank. 
Bank verifies the Merchant with 
SM
e
 = Y mod n 
Also checks for the double spending of the coin. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
    CONCLUSION & FUTURESCOPE 
 
7.1. CONCLUSION & FUTURE SCOPE  
 
This Thesis presents a distinct Time stamped signature scheme (TSS) based on 
computationally hard problems. This scheme consists of less computational overhead and 
supports message recovery feature. Moreover, this scheme is resistant to forgery attack and 
parameter reduction attack. The power of the trusted third party TTS is limited. This scheme 
also supports message recovery, hence reduces the communicational overhead. This signature 
scheme confirms non-repudiation property. This scheme is secure, hence can be applicable to 
areas such as e-cash, e-bidding and e-commerce applications. Our scheme can be used in the 
traditional e-cash system for the signature generation and verification, which will decrease 
the communication bandwidth and the signing and verification time. Here in this section we 
are proposing the framework for the e-cash system and all the detailed parameters that all the 
entities/parties are going to use. This framework was proposed by Popescu and Oros. We 
have slightly modified their scheme and introduced our scheme in it. In our new E-cash 
scheme, we propose a new off-line E-cash system which maintains the security features like 
anonymity, double spending, unforgeability. It is also immune to various CCA attacks and 
can withstand them; it implements the tracing protocol. We use three different protocols: 
account opening, payment and deposit protocol for the development of the e-cash system 
which can be used for secure payment across internet and other networks. An E-cash system 
which incorporates all the security features in it and helps in the secure payments to the 
merchants. It also takes care of the various attacks to which the e-cash is vulnerable and tries 
to resist them; In a nutshell, this e-cash scheme facilitates payments to the merchants and 
helps in exchange of merchandise also by implementing various protocols for secure 
communication between the merchants and the customers as well as between the merchants 
28 
 
and the Bank. In future research can be done on our scheme to lower its computation cost and 
communication overhead. Also research can be done to incorporate timestamping feature to 
some of the highly proved secured signcryption schemes which can be applicable to highly 
security sensitive application like e-bidding, e-voting, e-transactions etc.  
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